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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1947-1948*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

of the significant cases falling in the realm of corporate law decided within the past year have bearing on the
fundamental nature of a corporation and the rights and liabilities
which may arise from the adoption of that form of organization.
At the outset, it may be noted that disregard of the separate entity
theory, and application of the alter ego theory, of corporate
existence has frequently occurred in the past at the request of
third persons who would otherwise be harmed if the corporate veil
could not be pierced to reach the true owner of the enterprise.
It is unusual, however, to find situations such as that involved in
Earp v. Schmitz' where the sole owner of a business, in order to
avoid a forfeiture of his lease, was allowed to show that the formal
corporate cloak which he adopted in fact possessed no legal
significance.

T

HE BULK

In much the same way, instances calling for the use of the
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 397 Ill. 399 to 400 Ill. 347; from 332 Iln. App. 161 to
334 Ill. App. 629. As the Illinois legislature was not in session during the period,
there are no statutory modifications to report.
1334 Ill. App. 382, 79 N. E. (2d) 637 (1948). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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writ of mandamus in cases involving purely private corporations
are not rare,2 but the case of People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern
University3 goes to unusual length in an effort to establish that a
private educational institution is not subject to mandamus, as for
example to compel the admission of a prospective student, albeit
a publicly maintained university or college might be so subject. 4
There can be no quarrel with the outcome of the case, for the
applicant there seeking admission to the university had failed to
show the necessary clear right to the writ, 5 but since every corporation owes its existence to state action, whether evidenced by
general or special statute, there would seem to be no doubt that
the public character of the franchise exercised by a corporation is
such as would support mandamus, as well as quo warranto, in a
proper case.6 The fact that the corporation in question was
engaged in eleemosynary activities rather than in profit-making
enterprises should not be made the test by which to decide its
immunity from suit.
At the time a new immunity seems to have been created for
certain corporations, another one favoring them appears marked
for eventual elimination. The deep-seated and steady pressure to
bring about a nullification of the immunity heretofore granted to
charitable corporations from tort liability for the acts of their
2 See note in 22 CHICAGo-KNT LAW REvIuw 201 discussing the right to obtain
mandamus to secure inspection of corporate books and records.
3333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N. E. (2d) 345 (1948), cause transferred in 396 Ill. 233,
71 N. E. (2d) 156 (1947) because no constitutional issue was involved.
4 In People ex rel. Board of Trustees v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N. E. (2d) 951
(1943), mandamus was refused because the requisite clear right thereto had not
been shown, at least as to part of the case. See also North v. Trustees of the University of Illinois, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N. E. 54 (1891) ; Anthony v. Syracuse University,
130 Misc. 249, 223 N. Y. S. 796 (1927), reversed in 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N. Y. S.
435 (1928).
5 See People v. City of Chicago, 382 Ill. 500, 48 N. E. (2d) 329 (1943). Admission
to the university in the instant case was subject to a reserved right, on the part of
the university corporation, to reject any application for any reason it might deem
adequate.
6 Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. 1, 79 A. 790 (1911). In People v. Utica
Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 358 at 387, 8 Am. Dec. 243 at 257, the court said: ". . . a
privilege or immunity . . . which cannot legally be exercised without legislative
grant, would be a franchise."
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agents,7 particularly where the charity has seen fit to insure
against the risk, has resulted in the decision pronounced by the
Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Wendt v.
Servite Fathers." The dike of immunity has not entirely collapsed
for the court there restricted its decision to the point that liability
may be present where "insurance exists and provides a fund from
which tort liability may be collected so as not to impair the trust
fund," 9 but at least a way has been shown by which to displace
such holdings as those found in Myers v. Young Men's Christian
Association of Quincyl° and in Piperv. Epstein.". Careful observance must be given to the tactical steps pursued in the most recent
of these cases to avoid the pitfall of improper and prejudicial disclosure of the fact of insurance to the jury, but once that difficulty
is surmounted there would seem to be no longer any adequate
basis for an immunity not enjoyed by any other type of enter12
prise.
It was the evident purpose of the legislature, when enacting
Section 9 of the Business Corporation Act, 13 to prevent the confusion which could well arise from having two corporations operating in Illinois where the names of both might be deceptively
similar in nature. According to the case of Ernest Freeman &
Company v. Robert G. Regan Company,1 4 however, that statute
can have no application to a situation where one of the corpora7 Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556 (1905).
8332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RLViEw 279, 36 In. B. J. 488, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 248.
9332 Ill. App. 618 at 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 at 349.
1o 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942), criticized in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviw 256.
11326 I1. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945), criticized in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 266.
12 In Moore v. Moyle, 335 Ill. App. 342, 82 N. E. (2d) 61 (1948), not in the period
of this survey, the Appellate Court for the Second District denied recovery in a suit
on substantially identical facts to the instant case without referring to the holding
therein although it did cite the case of Piper v. Epstein. It is understood that a
certificate of importance has been issued and the case is now pending review before
the Illinois Supreme Court.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.9.
14 332 Ill. App. 637, 76 N. E. (2d) 514 (1947).
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tions has been dissolved, or has had its name changed, and another
corporation, bearing an identical name, is later organized even
though such organization occur in a short space of time after the
dissolution or amendment. The net result of the holding was that
the plaintiff therein, having a claim against the first concern, found
itself properly barred from suing the second one but not until it
had had the unpleasant experience of wasting time and money
pursuing a will o' the wisp. There might be occasion to consider
the wisdom of enacting an amendment to the statute so as to
forbid the approval of articles of incorporation for new enterprises which seek to use names previously utilized at least until
some stated period of time has elapsed so as to permit the dissipation of any confusion which otherwise could, and in this instance
did, well occur from the similarity in the names.
Although the decision in Western Foundry Company v.
Wicker 15 called for an interpretation of provisions contained in the
1919 General Corporation Act 16 which were repealed by the adoption of the present Business Corporation Act, the problem therein
involved is one which can well arise today. As it is believed the
same result would be achieved under the present statute, the case
warrants attention. The litigation grew out of the efforts of an
Illinois corporation to relieve itself of a substantial backlog of
unearned and undeclared cumulative dividends on its preferred
stock by a charter amendment intended to produce a waiver and
release thereof on the part of the preferred stockholders without
any change in the capital structure insofar as it concerned them
and upon no other consideration than a resumption of dividend
payments with respect to the future. More than two-thirds of
the outstanding preferred shares were voted as being in favor of
the amendment, but defendant, a preferred shareholder, objected
to the validity of the purported change and demanded payment
of the arrearages. In an action designed to obtain a declaratory
judgment establishing validity of the amendment so ratified, the
15 335 Ill. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d) 548 (1948).
16 Laws 1919, pp. 328-9, § 59.

Leave to appeal has been granted.
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court held that the statutory provisions authorizing charter amendment did not extend to the point of permitting the change to have
retroactive operation, hence declared the purported change to be
invalid. The present statute being silent with respect to the right
17
to cancel accumulations of undeclared preferred dividends, it
would seem as if the backlog of arrearages on preferred shares
can be waived or released only provided (a) all preferred shareholders consent, or (b) some substitute form of payment, such as
the issuance of additional shares, be made to them as an acceptable
satisfaction for their claims.
Some decisions concerning the rights of shareholders are noteworthy. Statements by way of dicta exist in the Illinois decisions
to the effect that, upon dissolution of a corporation, the title to
corporate assets does not become vacant but rather falls on those
who contributed to the capital to be administered, subject to the
rights of creditors, for their benefit.' It was not until the case of
Brooks v. Saloy,19 however, that the issue was squarely presented
as to the right of a minority shareholder of a defunct corporation,
who was neither officer or director, to maintain a representative
suit in equity to remove and cancel certain devious transactions,
as clouds on the title, by which the defendants had acquired possession of the corporate real estate and thereafter to cause a
partition to be made among the former shareholders. The Appellate Court translated the dicta into fact by permitting the share17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.52, dealing with the right to amend the articles
of incorporation, merely speaks of the power to amend so as to change ". . . the
preferences... and the special or relative rights in respect of all or any part" of the

corporate shares.
18 Statements In Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N. E. 420,
17 L. R. A. 818 (1892), are clearly dicta for the Issue there turned on the right of a
court of equity, in the absence of a statute, to conduct dissolution proceedings. In
Gulf Lines Connecting R. R. of Illinois v. Golconda Northern Ry., 290 Ill. 384,
125 N. E. 357 (1919), the court had merely to determine the effect, if any, of the
subsequent dissolution of the corporate grantor on a conveyance of a fee simple
title made by it while it still retained life. Language in Walden Home Builders,
Inc. v. Schmit, 326 Ill. App. 386, 62 N. E. (2d) 11 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw Ruvmw 345, possesses no greater significance for the court had to decide
whether the corporation itself, after dissolution, might have the benefit of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.94, in support of its own suit to recover on claims due to it
before dissolution.
19334 Ill. App. 93, 79 N. E. (2d) 97 (1948).
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holder to proceed despite a decree at nisi prius dismissing the
complaint for want of equity. Inasmuch as the suit was of equitable
character, it might be inferred from that case that title to the
corporate property could be said to vest in any shareholder, as a
trustee, who should see fit to concern himself over the assets.
Would not confusion over ownership be lessened if the title, likewise in trust, had been said to vest in those who had, at the time
of dissolution, constituted the board of directors? Certainly, a
more workable liquidation would follow from such a solution and
title be more readily made marketable than if conveyance had to
20
be obtained from all the former shareholders.
For certain purposes, the Business Corporation Act defines a
shareholder as one who is "a holder of record of shares in a
corporation." 21 That definition, of course, can have no application to matters falling beyond the scope of the statute. It is not
surprising to note, therefore, that the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, in the case of HFG Company v. Pioneer
Publishing Company,22 held that one did not have to be a record
holder of shares in order to maintain a representative suit so long
as he did have an equitable and beneficial interest therein, the
federal rule merely requiring that he be a "shareholder" at the
time of the transaction made the basis of the complaint. 23 The
rule announced long ago in Green v. Hedenburg24 does not appear
to have been changed in any respect.
Notice was taken previously of the interlocutory determination in the case of Rinn v. Broadway Trust c Savings Bank of
20 See 26 Chicago Bar Rec. 141-2 (1945).
21111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.32, § 157.2(g).
22 162 F. (2d) 536 (1947).
23 See Rule 23b of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. foil. § 723c.
Lindley, D. J., concurred specially on the ground that the rule in question was solely
procedural in character whereas the determination as to what was necessary to
constitute one a shareholder involved a question of substantive right to be decided
by reference to local law.
24 159 Ill.
489, 42 N. E. 851, 50 Am. St. Rep. 178 (1896). The plaintiff there was
regarded as a "shareholder" for this purpose, although his holding of corporate
stock was for collateral security only. The report of the case, however, fails to
disclose whether the shares had been registered in plaintiff's name as pledgee. See
n. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.30.
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Chicago2 5 which purported to indicate that a stockholder of an
insolvent state bank, or one who held shares in a bank in course
of voluntary liquidation, might bring a representative suit against
the officers and directors based on their malfeasance or misfeasance while in office. Attention was then drawn to the fact
that exclusive jurisdiction in cases of that character belonged in
the hands of the State Auditor,2 6 so that the remedy of the shareholder ought, more nearly, be by pursuing mandamus proceedings
against the state official designed to compel him to act rather
than by attempting to maintain an independent suit. Subsequent
to the return of the case to the trial court, the stockholder's suit
was dismissed for want of equity. An abstract opinion rendered
on an appeal from that decree would now seem to confirm the
27
criticism addressed to the former determination.
While the case was one primarily involving a problem as to
the construction to be placed on language found in a voting trust
agreement, the lawyer engaged in corporate practice should not
overlook the decision announced by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Olson v. Rossetter.2 The question arose because of the presence
of a statement in one part of a voting trust agreement to the effect
that the trust should "terminate in any event" on a designated
date whereas, in another part thereof, appeared a reserved power
in favor of a majority of the beneficiaries to amend, alter or
modify the agreement. It was held that the reserved power to
amend was not broad enough to permit an extension of the
arrangement beyond the original term. Now that voting trusts
are apparently legalized in Illinois, 29 there will probably be occa25326 Ill. App. 376, 62 N. E. (2d) 8 (1945), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 4, and see comment thereon in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 188.
26 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 16%, § 11, and McIlvaine v. City Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. of Chicago, 314 Ill. App. 496, 42 N. E. (2d) 93 (1942).
27333 Ill. App. 157, 76 N. E. (2d) 800 (1948). See particularly headnotes 1, 2
and 3 in 76 N. E. (2d) 800-1.
28399 Ill. 232, 77 N. E. (2d) 652 (1948), affirming 330 Ill. App. 304, 71 N. E. (2d)
556 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KKNT LAW REviEw 2. The case was consolidated
with the appeal granted in Russ v. Blair, and resulted in the reversal of the decision
therein: 330 Ill. App. 571, 71 N. E. (2d) 838 (1947).
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 32, § 157.30a. But see Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 3.
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sion to make more frequent use in the future of that device
designed to maintain corporate control. If such a trust is designed
to run for ten years, the maximum period sanctioned by the
statute, there would be no problem of the type that confronted
the court in the Olson case for any attempt to provide for an
extension of duration beyond the legal limit would be stricken
down as opposed to a clear legislative declaration of the new
public policy. If a shorter period of life be established and there
may be reason to consider the possibility of an extension, the
power to amend should then be expressed in sufficiently broad
language to cover that eventuality and the period of duration
should be so stated as to omit the phrase providing for termination "in any event" on the designated day.
PRINCIPAL AND AGE-T

The nature of the relationship existing between two persons
is primarily a question of fact, but may involve the application of
legal doctrines. It is for this reason that the decision in Sea
Insurance Company v. Sinks8 ° becomes of some importance to the
law of agency. According to the facts therein, a freight forwarder who lacked adequate equipment of his own engaged the
defendant, a trucker, to unload certain railroad cars and deliver
the contents to designated places. While the goods were in the
possession of the defendant the same were destroyed by fire of
unknown origin. The freight forwarder was reimbursed for his
loss by plaintiff, an insurance company, and the latter sued
defendant under the theory of subrogation. If defendant was an
agent of the freight forwarder, he would be liable only upon a
showing of negligence on his part. If defendant instead acted-in
the capacity of a common carrier or a bailee for hire, he was either
an insurer or at least bound to show the exercise of reasonable
care in the handling of the cargo. Plaintiff, claiming the defendant to be a common carrier, proved that defendant possessed certificates of convenience and necessity issued by both the federal
30166

F. (2d) 623 (1948).

SURVBY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1947-1948

and the state commerce commissions, 31 and urged that such certificates defined defendant's legal status, thereby automatically
excluding defendant from contracting in any other capacity than
that of a common carrier. Judgment for the defendant in the
trial court was, however, affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The higher court met plaintiff's rather novel contention by
noting that Illinois law would control and, according to state law,
whether the defendant was or was not a common carrier had to
be determined, as a matter of fact, from the activity concerned
rather than from the corporate character of the defendant or from
its declared purposes.8 2 The lower court had found the agreement
between the parties to be one under which the trucker was not to
issue any bill of lading, nor participate in any tariff, or issue
delivery receipts. Such finding, adopted by the reviewing court,
was held to be substantial evidence that the relationship between
the parties was one of principal and agent. The fact that the
trucker was expected to use his own men and equipment while
performing the job, while significant, lost much of its effect when
coupled with the fact that the principal had neither. The court
also expressed the belief that there was nothing in the Illinois
law which would prohibit a local carrier, while possessed of an
operating certificate, from entering into a purely private arrangement external thereto.3 3
Two well established principles of agency law, albeit ones
frequently forgotten, were reaffirmed in the case of Leach. v.
Hazel8 4 when the court reversed a decree for specific performance
of a land contract, made through an agent, because of the absence
31 The state certificate was issued pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 951/2, § 240
et seq.
32 See Rathbun v. Ocean Accident Corp., 299 Ill. 562, 132 N. E. 754, 19 A. L. R.
140 (1921) ; Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Fisher, 291 Ill. App. 495, 10 N. E. (2d) 220

(199T).
33 The court noted that enforcement of the statute above noted properly belonged
to the designated state department through proceedings to be conducted, if at all,
in state tribunals.
34398 Ill. 33, 74 N. E. (2d) 797 (1947).
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of written authority given to the agent to make such a contract3 5
plus the further point that a real estate broker employed to find a
purchaser, even though the terms of sale be fully prescribed, does
not, merely by his hiring, possess authority to execute a contract
of sale which will be binding on the owner-principal.
LABOR LAW

Application and interpretation of the Unemployment Compensation Act became the matter of concern in three significant
cases. In the first, that of Donaldson v. Gordon,36 the question
was one as to whether or not certain solicitors were employees
within the meaning of the statute. The employer sought review
of a determination that he was liable to contribute to the compensation fund, claiming the solicitors were not employees since
their services were not performed "for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied." 37 The arrangement between the parties was one under which the solicitor sought
prospective customers for the installation of floor coverings to
whom an offer to do the job for a fixed sum would be made. The
offer would then be submitted to Donaldson who was at liberty
to accept or reject it. If accepted, the installation was completed
under Donaldson's exclusive control and he collected the contract
price. The money so collected was first applied to pay all costs,
including price of material, labor, transportation and similar
charges. The net balance was then divided between Donaldson
and the solicitor equally, or if a loss had been sustained it was
borne by both on the same basis. The solicitors were not required
to work any specified number of days or hours, were not obliged
to make reports to Donaldson, and were free to hire assistants or
salesmen whose salaries were paid by the solicitors exclusively.
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled, on these facts, that Donaldson was exempt for, while the arrangement might or might not
35 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 59, § 2.
36 397 IMi.488, 74 N. E. (2d) 816 (1947).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 48, § 218(f) (1).
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be a partnership, 8 it was clearly not one of employment as (a)
the services were not performed for "wages," that term contemplating payments of fixed sums without deduction or possibility
of loss from the engagement and without regard to whether the
employer gains or loses by the transaction, and (b) did not involve
a "hiring," which postulates a contract for services to be rendered to the employing unit. Two independent elements were necessary here before Donaldson would be obligated to the solicitor.
First, he had to accept the offer, and second, the job had to be
completed at a profit. In effect, the solicitor had to take a gamble
on both elements, hence the compensation, if any, received could
not be deemed "wages" within the contemplation of the statute.
Questions concerning the right to unemployment compensation benefits were involved in Fash v. Gordon.3 9 A labor dispute
had developed therein over the renewal of a collective bargaining
contract. The union submitted the question of renewal to the
War Labor Board which recommended temporary extension of the
agreement pending determination of certain disputed facts by the
National Labor Relations Board. The employer refused to accede
to this suggestion and the union members went out on strike.
Certain of the employees sought unemployment compensation
benefits for time lost by the strike but were denied any allowance
by the Director. The circuit court reversed the ruling, but the
Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the Director on the
ground the case fell clearly within Section 7(d) of the Act. 40 The
employees had argued that no labor dispute was involved since
any "dispute" had been terminated after a decision on the merits
had been pronounced by the governmental agency. The unemployment, the employees said, was allegedly caused by the employer's
unilateral refusal to abide by the decision, for which refusal the
employees had claimed the right to endeavor to compel obedience
by strike measures. The court, however, indicated that, as the
38 In general, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 106 , § 6(1).
39398 Ill. 210, 75 N. E. (2d) 294 (1947), noted in 36 Ill. B. J. 364.
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 223, forbids compensation payments for "total or
partial unemployment ...

because of a labor dispute."
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statute did not differentiate between stoppages of work caused by
either employees or employers, so long as the stoppage grew out
of a labor dispute, compensation could not be granted. It likewise
held that the initial labor dispute could not be regarded as ended
until agreement over the contract terms was reached, whether that
result was produced by submission to the order of the administrative board or from pressure generated by the strike. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the demands, or the merits of the
dispute, were said to have no place in determining the question of
whether or not a labor dispute existed.
Much the same type of question was presented in the case of
Bankston Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Gordon4 ' except there the specific issue turned on whether a strike resulting from the discharge
of certain employees because of a slowdown in work should serve
to bar the employees from compensation benefits. One employee,
a truck driver, was prevented from pursuing his regular occupation because of a breakdown at the mine. The company assigned
him to temporary duty at a slightly lower rate of compensation.
To compel payment to him of the ordinary wage rate, other truck
drivers employed at the same mine slowed down their performance to approximately fifteen per cent. of capacity. For this,
they were discharged. The miners then ceased work in order to
coerce the employer into rehiring the truck drivers, but finally
returned to duty after a compromise had been worked out. Denial
of compensation benefits was affirmed when the court indicated
that a "labor dispute" was not necessarily synonymous with
"strike," the latter term indicating the presence of the former
but not vice versa, for a labor dispute could arise where the men
quit because of a failure to pay agreed sums, 42 or until a new
contract was made, or in an effort to secure more favorable terms,
and could even develop from action taken by the employer with
respect to wages or conditions of employment. A work stoppage
produced by a labor dispute, whatever the reason for its existence
41399 Ill. 291, 77 N. E. (2d) 670 (1948).
42 See Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N. E. (2d) 637 (1947),
in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 12-3.

noted

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1947-1948

might be, was deemed sufficient automatically to preclude payment
of benefits.
It is proper to note that two decisions mentioned in a prior
survey have been left unchanged by any action of the Supreme
Court on further review. Application for writ of error in Dinoffria
v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs Local
Union No. 17941 was granted but, on further consideration, the
writ was dismissed because no constitutional issue had, in fact,
been decided by the Appellate Court. 4 As a consequence, the
opinion of the latter tribunal, to the effect that an attempted
organization of self-employers into an employee's union constitutes an unlawful labor objective, stands in full force and effect.
Yet the status of the law in Illinois remains uncertain for two
45
decisions uphold the right in contrast to the one which denies it.
The court also affirmed the holding in Montgomery Ward c Company v. United Retail, Wholesale c Department Store Employees,
C.I.O.,46 which had dealt with the right of an employer to secure
injunction against defamatory statements concerning it made by
the union.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Only one novel point arose during the period of this survey
concerning the law regarding workmen's compensation. The
plaintiff employer, in the case of Carmack v. Great American
Indemnity Company,47 had been obliged to pay additional compensation to an illegally employed minor and sought reimbursement from the insurance carrier. His right to recover was affirmed
by the Supreme Court on the ground that Section 26(a) (3) of the
43331 11. App. 129, 72 N. E. (2d) 635 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LA.W
REvIEw 343 and 26 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REvi'w 13-4
44399 111. 304, 77 N. E. (2d) 661 (1948).
45 See Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, 315 Ill. App. 328, 43 N. E. (2d)
198 (1942), petition for leave to appeal dismissed 382 Ill. 124, 46 N. E. (2d) 27
(1943) ; Baker v. Retail Clerks' I. Protective Ass'n, 313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N. E. (2d)
571 (1942).
46400 Ill. 38, 79 N. E. (2d) 46 (1948), affirming 330 Ill. App. 49, 70 N. E. (2d) 75
(1946), noted in 26 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 14 and 35-6.

47400 Ill. 93, 78 N. E. (2d) 507 (1948), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT Lw REVIEW
296.
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Illinois Compensation Act,4 as well as the broad terms of the
policy coverage, 49 required that result. From the standpoint of
the carrier, such a decision does nothing to discourage the employer from engaging in indiscriminate hiring of minor employees.
It should be said, however, on behalf of the minor employee that
a firm public policy requires that he be protected against such
hazards as can be anticipated. Among such hazards is the possibility that the employer may become insolvent and be unable to
respond for the additional compensation. To hold otherwise would
leave the minor without recourse against the carrier. It might be
noted that the problem seems to have been handled more effectively in Wisconsin under an appropriate statute. °
II.

CONTRACTS

Only one case can be said to contain anything significant so
far as general contract doctrines are concerned and even that is
of limited appeal. In Manthei v. Heimerdinger' an argument
arose as to whether a release given as to a common-law right of
action for personal injuries growing out of an automobile accident
should also operate to discharge a tavern proprietor from liability
even though he had, in violation of the Liquor Control Act, 2 sold
liquor to the already intoxicated tort-feasor. It is, without doubt,
clear that a release of one joint tort-feasor will operate to discharge
all others jointly responsible for the tort despite any contrary
intention on the part of the contracting parties. If, however, the
injury sustained may be said to be the result of two or more
independent but concurring causes, then an area of doubt may
exist as to whether the release of one serves to release all, especially so if the causes of action rest on different foundations and
48 111. 1Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 163(a) (3).
49 See paragraph I (a) of the standard form of workmen's compensation policy in
use in Illinois.
50 Wis. Stat. 1943, Ch. 102, § 102.62.
1332 Il. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvmw 358 and 43 IlI. L. Rev. 409.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.

